Skip to content

世界主义:普世道德标准真的存在么?

 



我们翻译这篇文章的理由


对Personal Identity这一历史悠久的哲学问题进行了深入浅出的讨论。行文流畅明晰,引领(哪怕是最外行的)读者置身于问题探讨的语境中。同时,作为一种颇具神秘吸引力的立场,世界主义到底是可欲并可行的,还是过分理想的空中楼阁?作者对读者发出了深思的邀约。
                                                                                    -徐炜

  


👇


世界主义:普世道德标准真的存在么?


作者:Kenneth Taylor 

译者:徐炜&王宇琪

校对:郭嘉宁

策划:李蕾


Negotiating Identities: The Crash Solution


协商身份认同:“撞车”之道


I want to try to dig a little deeper in this post into a question that kind of simmered beneath the surface of our discussion but wasn’t really addressed headon. The issue has a little bit to do with identities that are regarded bythose who adopt them as in some ways “non-negotiable” and as more orless direct sources of directives about how to live one’s own life, and asource of directives about how to live one’s life in relation to others who don’t share one’s identity and may even be hostile to it in some ways. 

在本文中,我想尝试更深入地探索这样一个问题,它在我们的讨论中暗流涌动,但并未真正得到解决。该问题涉及在某种程度上被视作“不可协商”的身份认同,这些身份或多或少直接指导着其持有者如何生活,也指导着他们该如何与拥有不同身份、甚至在某些情况下对自己的身份持有敌意的人相处。


By a “non-negotiable” aspect of an identity I mean, roughly, an aspect that the”holder” of that identity regards as non-negotiable and thus as not subject to revision and reconfiguration.  It doesn’t matter for my purposes whether the relevant identity is “really” up for grabs or subject to revision in certain ways.  I think probably all identities are revisable and are subject to reconfiguration in light of all sorts of things.  For example, some identities simply cease to be possible at certain junctures. Once the slaves were freed, one could remain an unreconstructed southern racist, but you had to find new ways to do so.  You couldn’t simply persist as a slaving-owning agrarian southerner, with all that entailed.

我所说的身份中“不可协商”的部分,大意是指身份的“持有者”认为不可协商、也因此不可修改和重构的方面。就我的目的而言,这一身份本身是否“真正”是可争取的,或是可以通过某些方式修改的,这些都无关紧要。我认为可能所有的身份认同都是可变的,可以受各类因素影响而进行重构。例如,某些身份在某些时刻就不复存在了。一旦奴隶被解放,一个人可能仍是一个顽固不化的南方种族主义者,但必须找到一种新的方式来延续自己的身份。受随之而来的制约,你不能只仍然坚持做一个南方农场的奴隶主。


On my view, much social friction, political turmoil, cultural change is driven by the “clash” of identities regarded as non-negotiable with realities on the ground that exert pressure for the reconfiguration of such identities.   I’m not saying that only identities regarded asnon-negotiable are subject to external pressures of this sort.  But thosewho regard some “threatened”   aspect of their identity asnon-negotiable are, I think, likely to resist in different ways from those whoregard their identities as negotiable.  One can either participate willingly or be dragged kicking and screaming into the reconfiguration of an identity, for example. Think of the heretofore unreconstructed sexist who sincerely tries to re-think sex and gender in response to social change vs the heretofore unreconstructed sexist who does everything in his power to help maintain the old order and resist the new.

在我看来,许多社会摩擦、政治动荡和文化变革都是由身份认同“冲突”所驱动的,这些身份认同被认作不可协商,而现实压力迫使它们重构。我并不是说只有被视为不可协商的身份认同才会面临这种外部压力,而是说,对于那些认为自己身份的某些“受到威胁”之处是不可协商的人,他们抗拒改变的方式不同于那些认为自己的身份是可协商的人。例如,对于身份的重构,一个人可以自愿参与,也可以不情愿地被拖入其中。想想过去一直顽固守旧的性别歧视者,面对社会变化,有些人诚恳地试图重新思考性和性别,而有些人尽其所能维护旧秩序,抵制新变化。


The real question, I suppose, is what, if any, aspects of an identity are worth regardingas non-negotiable?   I’m not sure there’s an a priori “once and for all” answer to that question.   When I’m in a “liberalcosmopolitan” frame of mind, I’m tempted to say that just those aspects of one’s identity that are consistent with a thorough going allegiance to”the party of humanity” are worth considering non-negotiable.Everything that divides and separates, that pits “them” against”us” is unworthy of being regarded as non-negotiable.

在我看来,真正的问题是,身份的哪些方面(如果有的话)是值得被视为不可协商的?对于这个问题,我不确定是否有一个“一劳永逸”的先验答案。当以一种“自由世界主义者(liberal cosmopolitan)”的视角思考时,我想说,在一个人的身份中,只有那些完全忠于“人类党(the party of humanity)”的方面才值得被视作不可协商。一切造成分裂、区隔、形成“他们”与“我们”这种对立关系的东西都不值得被认为是没有商量余地的。


There is probably something right about that. But although I count myself a”would-be” liberal cosmopolitan, I actually regard a liberal cosmopolitanism as a “that toward which” some of us have chosen to work, not as an actual concrete achievement already present on the ground. I mean several things by that. I’ve laid out some of it in other posts including How to be a Relativist and I took on some related issues in  On the Absence of Dogmatism. But I don’t really want to re-hash those posts now. 

这种看法可能是对的。但尽管我把自己当作一个“准”自由世界主义者,实际上,我深知它只是我们中的一些人选择为之奋斗的“目标”,而不是既存的实在成就。这句话有几项意涵,我已在其他的文章中有所罗列,比如“如何成为一个相对主义者”,在“失落的教条主义”中我也讨论了一些相关问题。但这里我不想赘述。


The current point I want to make about liberal cosmopolitanism is that in one way it doesn’t seem thick enough to support a concrete, particular identity that istied up with a shared way of life.  And in that sense liberal cosmopolitanism doesn’t really define one possible identity that one might adopt among other possible identities. What, exactly, would it mean to live on behalf of “humanity at large”? What would be the character of one’s relation to one’s family, friends, fellow citizens, or co-coreligionists if one lived primarily as one human among others?  One possible answer is that you would always be a stranger,invested in none of the special projects that define one’s nation or religion, sharing none of the special attachments that define one’s family. Indeed, perhaps liberal cosmopolitans couldn’t even share a special attachment to each other, it would seem.  What kind of life is that?  A rootless life, a life lived always and everywhere “on the outside,” always and everywhere as a stranger.

关于自由世界主义,我现在想说的是,在某种程度上,它似乎还不足以支持一种具体的、特定的、与一种共同生活方式相连的身份认同。在这一意义上,自由世界主义并不能真正明确地给出一种身份的可能性,使得人们在各种可能的身份选项中选择它。为“全人类”而活到底意味着什么?如果一个人主要以人类一份子的身份生活,那么他与家人、朋友、同胞或教友的关系会是如何的?一个可能的答案是,你将永远是一个局外人,不投身于任何为一个人定义其国族或宗教的特殊项目,不牵扯于任何为一个人定义其家庭的特殊联结。事实上,这样看来,也许自由世界主义者甚至不能彼此分享一种特殊联系。那是什么样的生活?一种无根的生活,一种每时每地身处“局外”的生活,一个永恒的异乡人。


I don’t mean to deny that there are cosmopolitan responses to this line of criticism.   Recall, for example, Appiah’s way of thinking about the difference between ethics and morality. Appiah thinks of identities as “ethically significant” partly because an identity provides answers tothe question “How shall I live?”  He distinguishes that question from the question for morality “What do I owe to others.”  But he clearly thinks that ethics and morality can conflict. That’s because he allows that one’s choices about how to live, under what “identity” flag to march, can generate obligations, commitments, entitlements, of their own. But so, can morality. Morality is an independent source of commitments, obligations, and entitlements, not necessarily tied to particular, local, concrete identities. Sometimes the demands of ethics arising from one’s particular, local, concrete identity simply clash with the demands of morality. But Appiah believes, I think, that the demands of morality have a certain priority — though he also thinks this priority is”defeasible,” if I understand him rightly.

世界主义者也对这种批评做出了回应,这一点我并不否认,比如回想一下阿皮亚(Appiah)对伦理与道德的区分。他认为身份认同具有“伦理意义”,部分原因是身份为“我该如何生活”这个伦理问题提供了答案,其不同于“我欠别人什么”的道德问题。但是,他显然认为伦理和道德存在冲突。这是由于在他看来,一个人可以对自己如何生活、在什么“身份”旗帜下生活进行选择,由此产生自己的义务、承诺和权利。道德类似而不同,它也是承诺、义务和权利的独立来源,却不一定与特定的、地域的、具体的身份有关。有时,一个人特定的、地域的、具体的身份所产生的伦理要求与道德要求完全冲突。但与此同时,如果我理解无误的话,阿皮亚相信道德需求有一定的优先性,尽管在他看来这种优先性是“有疏漏性的”(defeasible)。

译注:可废止推理(defeasible reasoning):有疏漏性推理是对推理形式的研究,它尽管令人信服,却不如演绎推理那么形式化和严格


You can sort of see, given what he thinks identities are like and where they come from, why someone like Appiah would think that morality has defeasible priority over ethics.   For Appiah, after all, there is not a fixed set of antecedently given identities.  We “create” and don’t merely inherit our identities. Now we don’t create them ex nihilo. Rather, we take what is pre-given, what is made available by the milieu in which we merely find ourselves, and we somehow make something brand new out of it, by engaging in Millian “experiments in living.”  We are always reconfiguring our identities, trying out new ways of living, sometimes, presumably, with great success and sometimes not so successfully.  This makes the ethical demands generated by our identities seem contingent and escapable.  And it makes the demands generated by morality –which, by contrast, don’t depend on the contingent localities of our identities — seem more binding, less contingent.

考虑到他对身份认同及其来源的看法,我们可以理解为什么像阿皮亚这样的人会认为道德相比伦理具有存在疏漏的优先权。毕竟对他来说,并没有一套固定的预先给定的身份认同。我们不仅仅是继承身份,我们“创造”身份。并且我们不是凭空创造身份,而是首先从我们身处的环境中获得那些预先给予的东西,接受它们,然后通过米利安(Millian)的“生活实验”,以某种方式从中创造出一些全新的东西。我们总是在重构自己的身份,尝试新的生活方式,可能有时会取得巨大的成功,有时则会受挫。这使得我们的身份所产生的伦理需求似乎是偶然的、可避免的。这也使得由道德产生的需求——相比之下,不依赖于我们的偶然性身份——看起来更有约束力,更加固定。


As long as one regards one’s identities as contingent and revisable in this way,maybe this all makes good sense. But what is the cosmopolitan supposed to say about to someone who regards some aspect or other of her identity as non-negotiable? And how does it help with the charge that the cosmopolitan is always and everywhere a rootless outsider? 

只要一个人认为自己的身份是偶然且可修改的,也许将道德置于伦理之上是合理的。但是,对于将自己身份的某些方面视为不可协商的人,世界主义者又该对他们说什么呢?关于针对世界主义者的指控——无论何时何地都是一个无根的局外人,阿皮亚的解释又有何帮助呢?


Take rootlessness first. Suppose the cosmopolitan grants that cosmopolitanism is not the source of one concrete particular identity among others. Cosmopolitanismreally articulates a kind of moral constraint to which all more particular identities are subject. The guiding principle might be whatever identity you adopt, make sure that it is consistent with having as part of one’s life plan due regard for the well-being of others. Live as an American, as a member of this or that club, or religion, or whatever, if you will, but in so living recognize that your club is merely one club among others and that the interests of your club do not trump the interests of humanity at large.

让我们先从无根性开始讨论。假定世界主义者承认,世界主义不是一个特定身份的来源,不能在众多身份中提供一种可被挑选的可能性。相反,世界主义所真正阐明了的是一种道德约束,所有更具体的身份都要受到这一原则的约束。指导原则可能是,无论你采用何种身份,都要确保它与个人整全的生活计划与对他人福祉的关切相一致。你可以当一个美国人,当这个或那个社团或宗教的成员,你想选择什么身份都可以。但在这样的生活中你应当认识到,你的社团只是其他所有社团中的一个,它的利益不能凌驾于整个人类的利益之上。


The cosmopolitan can even say that having some well-configured concrete particular identity is a good thing, one key to a well-lived human life, at least as longas it is constrained in the right way by considerations of morality and a due respect for the common humanity of all.

世界主义者甚至可以说,拥有某个具体的特定身份是一件好事,是好生活的关键——只要它以正确的方式受到道德考量约束,也对共同人性给予了尊重


I like this story a lot. On some days, I’m tempted to believe something rather like it, especially as an answer to the charge that the cosmopolitan is always and everywhere a stranger. But I’m not sure it follows that concern for our common humanity defeasibly trumps or overrides any more local, particular concrete concerns.

我很喜欢这样的描述。有时,我很愿意相信一些类似的东西,尤其相信以上图景可以回应”世界主义者无论何时何地都是一个无根的局外人 “这一指控。但我不确定这是否真的意味着,虽然存在疏漏,但是我们对共同人性的关注仍然可以战胜或压倒任何相较更近更具体的关切。


Here’s why. If who I am is in some sense defined by more local and particular attachments, I don’t see off hand why those local and particular attachments don’t trump whatever concern I feel for humanity at large. After all, it is thoselocal and particular attachments that make me an insider, that define wherehome is. Too much attachment to the common humanity of all really does threaten  to make me always and everywhere the outsider.

原因如下。如果“我是谁”在某种意义上是由更近更具体的依恋定义的,我不明白为什么这些近而具体的依恋不胜过我对整个人类的关切。毕竟,正是这些近而特殊的依恋使我成为一个局内人,定义了家的位置。而过多地依恋共有的(而非特定的)人性,确实有可能让我无时无刻不是局外人。


Now I’m not prepared to fully reject the claim that morality trumps ethics. I’m just looking for more of an argument than I’ve ever seen. To rephrase my problem. I started out wondering what we can say to people who regard some aspect of their identity as “non-negotiable.” But I see now I wasn’t entirely clear about what I meant by that. I meant that: (a) those non-negotiable aspects are sources of felt commitments, demands, entitlements,etc. that place the person who adopts the relevant identity deeply at odds with cosmopolitan principles of morality and/or competing demands from the concreteand particular identities of others; (b) those aspects are regarded by the relevant person or persons as somehow bedrock definers of who and what they are.

现在我还不准备完全否定道德高于伦理的说法。我只是想找一个更充分的论据。重新阐述一下我的问题:一开始,我想知道我们能对那些把自己身份的某些方面视为不可协商的人说些什么,但我现在发现先前我并没有说清楚什么是“不可协商的”。我的意思是: (a) 身份中那些不可协商的方面是某人感受到的承诺、要求、权利等的来源,这使得他反对“世界主义的道德原则”以及与自身观念相矛盾的“来自他人具体身份的要求”;(b) 该身份的持有者认为这些方面从根本上决定了“他们是谁”和“他们是什么”。


The cosmopolitan answer to my worry is basically that there can’t legitimately be such aspects of our identity. That’s because identities that are mobilized around injustice or immorality are somehow illegitimate. But I don’t know why that is so. Some would appeal to universal commandments of cold and impersonal reason or the warm glue of human sentiment to articulate the principles of justice that constrain all more locally generated entitlements. Some philosophers — like Rawls — think that to settle the principles of justice, we have to engage in an intellectual exercise of “abstracting away”from our concrete identities and histories. That’s part of the point of hisso-called “veil of ignorance.” I’ve never found this kind of move particularly convincing. I’ve never been able to see why I, living under the actual banners that I do live under, with the actual particular attachments that I in fact have, should be bound by judgments I would make under conditions in which I did not know, in effect, who I am. Saying in detail why I find such”abstracting away” arguments uncompelling would take a much longer post, though. So, I think I’ll leave it with that simple declaration of skepticism for now.

对于我的担忧,世界主义者的回答基本上是,在我们的身份中,不可能合法地存在这样的方面。因为出于某种原因,围绕着不公正或不道德而建立起来的身份是不合法的。但我不知道为什么是这样的。有些人会诉诸于冷酷无情的理性的普遍戒律,或者人类情感的温暖联结,来阐明正义原则如何制约着所有从更近的关系中产生的权利。一些哲学家—例如罗尔斯–认为,为了解决正义原则的问题,我们必须进行一种将自我从具体身份和历史中 “抽离 “的智力活动。这就是他所谓 “无知之幕 “的部分意义。我一直不觉得这种举动特别有说服力。当我设想自己在无知之幕下会做出何种判断时,我并不知道真正生活中的我究竟是谁。因此我也从来没能理解,为什么被确切依恋的约束的我要服从于无知之幕下的判断。然而,详述为什么我认为这种 “抽离 “的论点没有说服力则需要一个更长的帖子。所以,我暂就以这个简单的怀疑宣言结束吧。


Obviously, I haven’t settled anything here and there is really a lot more to say about all this. A whole lot more. You really should read Anthony’s book, because it says a lot about these issues, and it does so quite well. I suspect that the real answer to how we cope with identities worn heavily is something close to the“Crash” solution (or non-solution). In the movie Crash, people learn to see their common humanity across the gulfs that their identities create simply by crashing into one another, by being brought up short, by experiments in living running aground. Philosophers would like to believe that something more orderly — reasoned reflection on our common humanity, judgments made behind aveil of ignorance — might do the trick. But I think many have gotten it the wrong way around. If we really did have a shared moral vision, rooted in our common perception of our common humanity, that would be a grand thing. And it would be, I think, a singular and profound cultural achievement. The belief that such a thing just might be possible is, I think, the real innovation of the Enlightenment. And the project of trying to achieve the what the Enlightenment envisioned as a real possibility is a worthy and honorable one. But as I’ve said in other posts, the Enlightenment project is just that — a project and one not yet achieved. It is a mistake to think that there is already and has always been a shared moral community that is rooted in the mutually recognized and endorsed demands of our common humanity. It isn’t a mistake, though, to think that if we keep crashing into one another, we might someday manage to constitute such a community.

很明显,我在这里还没有解决任何问题,关于所有这些话题,真的还有很多话要说。很多很多。你真的应该读读安东尼的书,因为它对这些问题说了很多,而且说得相当好。我怀疑,对如何应对我们被身份拖累这一问题的真正答案,是类似于 “撞车 “的解决方案(或者说不解决方案)。在电影《撞车》中,仅仅通过相互碰撞、日常生活的突然暂停,以及在生活搁浅时进行的各种尝试,人们就学会了跨越身份造成的鸿沟,并看到了不同的人之间共同的人性。哲学家们愿意相信,一些更有秩序的东西——对共同人性进行理性反思,在无知之幕后做出决定——也许能起到作用。但我认为很多人弄错了。如果我们真的有一个共同的道德愿景,它植根于我们对共同人性的共同认识,那将是一件伟大的事情,一个独特而深刻的文化成就。同时我认为,对于这种可能性的信念是启蒙运动的真正创新。而试图将启蒙运动所设想的可能性变为真实的项目,是值得尊敬的。但正如我在其他文章中所说,启蒙工程只是一个工程,而且是一个尚未实现的工程。如果有人认为我们已经拥有一个共同的道德共同体,且它一直都存在着,植根于共同人性所产生的彼此承认和认可的要求,那么她就错了。不过,如果设想人们通过不断地相互碰撞,能够有朝一日构成这样一个共同体,这还是有希望的。




  • 本文原载于 The Philosophy Talk

  • 原文链接:https://www.philosophytalk.org/blog/negotiating-identities-crash-solution


一、了解取经号 | 我们是谁,在做什么,如何加入
二、学习贴士 | 如何打印输出PDF如何使用微信读书订阅取经号
三、翻译服务 | 咨询邮箱:[email protected]
四、社交媒体 | 微信公众号:取经号;微博:取经号JTW
五、译文归档 | 访问网站:qujinghao.com
六、学习社群 | 翻译社(暂停中)

添加伍豪微信,防止走丢



Comments are closed.