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愤怒之果

愤怒之果



我们翻译这篇文章的理由


很长一段时间以来,愤怒一直被诽谤和拒绝。但是愤怒的价值,不仅仅是情绪的宣泄,在改善未来,构建更加公平的政治环境方面,愤怒永远存在意义。

——李蕾


👇


愤怒之果


作者:Brian Wong 

译者:郭嘉宁 & 田阳光

校对:金殊羽

策划:李蕾


The Fruit of Anger

愤怒之果


“You have stolen my dreams and my childhood with your empty words. And yet I’m one of the lucky ones. People are suffering. People are dying. Entire ecosystems are collapsing. We are in the beginning of a mass extinction, and all you can talk about is money and fairy tales of eternal economic growth. How dare you!”

– Greta Thunberg, 23 September 2019, New York


你们满嘴空话,偷走了我的梦想与童年。即便如此,我还算幸运的。人们在痛苦中煎熬,人们在死亡线上徘徊,整个生态系统正在崩塌。一场大规模灭绝已经开始,你们却只顾着谈论金钱,编造经济永远持续增长的谎言。你们怎敢这样!

——格蕾塔·桑伯格,2019年9月23日,纽约



At her speech at the United Nations summit on the impending climate crisis, 16-year-old Greta Thunberg spoke with passion and anger, calling out those who have been apathetic towards bringing about global warming. Her speech was criticised by many for Thunberg’s bellicosity, which allegedly put off potential sympathisers to the movement. Anger is alienating, upsetting and even exclusionary under particular circumstances – yet one can’t help but feel that Thunberg’s anger is at least partially justified. After all, it is decades of unbridled carbon emissions and industrialisation that have led us to the mess we are in today.

在联合国气候危机峰会上所发表的演讲中,16岁的格蕾塔·桑伯格语气激动,怒斥那些导致了全球变暖却毫不在意的政客。许多人对桑伯格演讲中表现出的咄咄逼人感到不满,声称这会使潜在的环保运动支持者心生反感。愤怒会产生敌意,令人不快,甚至有时是排外的,但人们还是不禁会觉得桑伯格的愤怒至少在某些方面有理有据。毕竟,正是几十年来不加管控的二氧化碳排放与持续推进的工业化进程导致了今天的不堪局面。


Thunberg’s speech – and what we make of it – epitomises an age-old conflict between those who oppose anger for its seemingly counterproductive consequences, and those who find anger a natural and appropriate human emotion with value in both public and private spheres. what is the value of anger?For Aristotle, anger was ‘a desire accompanied by pain for perceived revenge caused by a perceived slight, of the sort directed against oneself or one’s own, the slight being undeserved’. Anger is thus reactive towards a perceived violation, and embeds within it a vindictive yearning for revenge.

桑伯格的演讲与我们的反应代表了一场为时已久的争辩:有人反对愤怒,因为愤怒似乎会带来适得其反的后果,而也有人将愤怒视为一种正常自然的人类情绪,对自己与公众领域都存在价值。愤怒的价值是什么呢?亚里士多德称,愤怒“伴随着痛苦,是一种想要复仇的欲望,源于自己或自己的所有物受到了不公正的对待。”因此愤怒是由于自身利益受到侵害而产生的,包含着对报复的渴望。


The philosopher Amia Srinivasan at the University of Oxford is an advocate of anger’s merits. Her work makes the case for anger by drawing extensively on fields ranging from political science and sociology to feminist epistemology. she notes that anger can be productive epistemically – that is, in the production, shaping and organising of our knowledge and understanding. It better enables victims to make sense of their oppression by heightening their emotions and allowing them to focus on specific features of their victimisation. Victims of injustice or circumstance are often told by their oppressors to blame themselves; Anger supplies those who are wronged or slighted with the resilience to say: ‘No! It is not my fault.’ It clarifies the injustice that befalls them, enabling individuals to make sense of their situations by access to their authentic feelings.

牛津大学哲学家阿米亚·斯里尼瓦桑(Amia Srinivasan)是愤怒有益的拥护者,通过大量援引从政治、社会学到女权认知论等领域的案例来为愤怒正名。她指出,从知识的角度看,愤怒是有益的,它可以帮助我们产生,形成并整理知识与对事物的理解。愤怒使受害者放大情绪,关注自己受害的特定特征,从而理解自己受压迫的状态。压迫者常常告诉身处不公的受害者去责怪自己,而愤怒让受害者变得坚强,勇于说出:“不!这不是我的错。”愤怒清晰地呈现出他们所受到的不公,使受害者通过感知真实的情绪来理解现状。


Anger is epistemically valuable not just for the individual, but also for those around them. 

从知识的角度,愤怒不仅对个体有利,对周围的人同样存在价值。


The philosopher Alison Jaggar at the University of Colorado Boulder observes in Just Methods (2014) that ‘anger becomes feminist anger when it involves the perception that the persistent importuning endured by one woman is a single instance of a widespread pattern of sexual harassment’. It is an emotion that both transcends and unites people by providing context for an individual’s grievances. When co-opted skilfully by just causes, anger enables victims to identify similarities in their lived experiences, overcoming the superficial differences that drive them apart.

科罗拉多大学博尔德分校哲学家艾莉森·贾格尔(Alison Jaggar)在《公正的方法》(Just Methods,2014)中表示,“当人们意识到一位女性受到的持续骚扰不是个例,而是反映了性骚扰的普遍现象,愤怒就变成了女权主义的愤怒。”愤怒为个人的不满提供了大背景,它超越了个人层面,让人们团结起来。当人们因为正义的事业恰当地聚在一起,愤怒能使受害者们发现彼此经历中的共同点,克服疏远彼此的表面差异。


The philosopher Maxime Lepoutre at Nuffield College in Oxford argues that anger – as expressed through speech or nonverbal cues – can direct attention to the most morally pressing features of particular situations. For instance, victims of domestic abuse, through spontaneous anger, articulate publicly the extent of violation and pain they experience at the hands of their abusers. Thunberg’s angry speech reminds us of the extent to which we are actively, presently complicit in the persistence of climate change. Communicative anger helps us understand what is at stake, and what is most important to those with whom we are speaking.

牛津大学纳菲尔德学院哲学家马克西姆·勒普特雷(Maxime Lepoutre)提出,愤怒——通过语言或非言语信号——能够使人们聚焦于特定情形中最急需解决的道德问题。比如,通过愤怒的爆发,家暴的受害者公开表达了施暴者所施加的侵害与痛苦是多么严重。桑伯格在演讲中怒气冲冲,提醒了我们当下的行为对气候变化的持续起了多少推动作用。当愤怒起交流作用时,它帮助我们理解危机何在,以及对我们的对话者而言什么是最重要的。


Anger can motivate people, too. As Srinivasan notes: ‘It is historically naive, after all, to think that white America would have been willing to embrace King’s vision of a unified, post-racial nation, if not for the threat of Malcolm X’s angry defiance.’ 

愤怒也可以给予人们动力。就像斯里尼瓦桑所说:“如果你认为白人至上的美国自愿接受了马丁·路德·金的愿景,成为一个团结一心,没有种族歧视的国家,那这种看待历史的方式就太天真了。如果没有马尔科姆·X的愤怒反抗在前,这是不可能发生的。”

注:马尔科姆·X为非裔美国人民权运动者,鼓励人们采用暴力自我防卫,主动抵抗种族歧视的警察与美国中产阶级。为了维护非裔美国人的利益,他呼吁颠覆现有的法律制度和社会规范。本文作者认为,正是马尔科姆·X的激进使得马丁·路德·金的态度显得温和可行,使民众愿意接受。

Moreover, sustaining a social movement is difficult, especially if its constituents come from socioeconomically disenfranchised backgrounds and are cynical about their chances of success. Attending marches and protests could be costly. The prospects of being imprisoned or persecuted are daunting. Against these obstacles, anger rallies people together – it transforms public, societal causes into intimate, personal reasons that you care about and are devoted to. By providing the individual with the instinctive justification to keep believing and carrying on, anger spurs and sustains action, even if the odds of succeeding are slim.

而且,维持社会运动困难重重,如果支持者社会经济地位低下,且对成功的可能性持悲观态度,坚持下去就更加艰难。参加游行抗议可能会让人付出巨大的代价。被关进监狱或被起诉的可能性令人害怕。愤怒可以使人们克服这些障碍,聚集在一起——如此,人们便不再是在为公众社会事业服务,而是在为你关心的亲密个人竭尽全力。即使成功机会渺茫,愤怒也会让个人出于本能去继续坚信与奋斗,促使人们采取行动并坚持下去。


More fundamentally, however, anger cuts across the layers of excuses and rationalisations that we regularly employ to shirk responsibility. because in our anger we come to the recognition that we possess the agency to have acted otherwise. In turn, such sense of responsibility propels us to consider how and where we could make a difference.

然而,更重要的是,愤怒可以冲破我们推卸责任时常用的各种借口和理由。在愤怒时,我们认识到我们有能力采取其他的行动。反过来,这种责任感驱使我们思考该如何以及在哪些方面有所作为。


Nussbaum sees anger as a primitive emotion that amplifies our worst tendencies

努斯鲍姆认为,愤怒是一种原始情绪,它放大了人性中的恶。


But anger also has its critics. Despite its many advantages, it can be injurious, even detrimental.As a pioneer in feminist philosophy and practical ethics, the philosopher Martha Nussbaum is one of anger’s most vocal critics. Nussbaum sees anger as a primitive emotion that amplifies our worst tendencies and jeopardises tolerance in democratic politics. She argues that anger has two components: the first is the recognition that a serious wrong has been committed; the second is a desire for the wrongdoer to suffer. We are angry towards what we perceive to be a violation of moral expectations, and – where there are clearly identifiable actors – we wish for justice to be served through their suffering the consequences.

但是,也有人对愤怒进行批判。尽管它有很多优点,但它也可能是有害的。作为女性主义哲学和实用伦理学的先驱,哲学家玛莎-努斯鲍姆是愤怒的最有力的批评者之一。努斯鲍姆认为愤怒是一种原始的情绪,放大了人性之中的恶,危害了民主政治中的宽容。她认为,愤怒由两部分组成:一是意识到产生了严重的错误;二是希望不法之徒承受苦果。对违反我们道德期望的行为,我们会感到愤怒,而且在明确知道行为人的情况下,我们希望通过让他们承担后果来伸张正义。


Anger is an overriding emotion – it is, by its vindictive and impulsive nature, uncontrollable and blinding. It wages war against cool and steady consideration of all reasons in decision making, by amplifying disproportionately our thirst for what we take to be justice. At its worst, anger is what propels terrorist ideology and mass violence, committed by psychopathic individuals to exact revenge and attain justice under their ideological conceptions. More mundanely, anger causes us to shut out dissent and take pleasure in inflicting pain upon others – it transforms others’ suffering into something we take to be right and warranted. We can be easily skewed by our biases and pre-existing views to project our anger on to the wrong individuals, thereby undermining our ability to act upon our considered judgments.

愤怒是一种压倒一切的情绪—-由于它的报复性和冲动性,它常常难以控制,并且有些盲目。在决策过程中,愤怒与冷静沉着的周密思索相对抗,因为它过度放大了我们内心对正义的渴望。在最坏的情况下,愤怒推动恐怖主义意识形态和大规模暴力,这些精神变态的人作出暴行,目的是在他们的意识形态概念下进行报复和实现正义。更为世俗的是,愤怒会使我们把不同意见拒之门外,并以给他人带来痛苦为乐—-他人的痛苦被我们认为正确且合理。我们很容易被我们的偏见和已有的观点所迷惑,把愤怒投射到错误的人身上,从而削弱了我们根据深思熟虑的判断而采取行动的能力。


Also, anger could be counterproductive in politics. For activists, anger could spur irrevocable violence or conflict, exclude those whom it targets, and incite polarisation and vitriol to the point of dissipating mass support for particular causes. 

此外,愤怒在政治上可能会产生反作用。对活动家来说,愤怒可能会引发不可挽回的暴力或冲突,将目标人群排除在外,并煽动两极分化和尖锐的情绪,消散群众对特定事业的支持。


So anger is clearly a double-edged sword. The question becomes: how should we weigh up the usefulness and appropriateness of anger, against its potentially deleterious effects?

因此,愤怒显然是一把双刃剑。现在的问题是:在愤怒的正当用途和可能产生的有害影响之间,我们应该如何权衡?


Srinivasan argues that, even if anger undermines the victim’s ability to obtain better outcomes and is counterproductive at combating injustice, there are cases where such anger might still be an apt response to injustice – independent of consequential considerations. The concept of aptness tracks what is appropriate in light of relevant factors and norms guiding our conduct and thoughts – that is, in describing whether our attitudes fit reasonable judgments towards the past. 

斯里尼瓦桑认为,即使愤怒会削弱受害者获得更好结果的能力,并且对打击不公正现象会起到反作用,但有些情况下,如果不考虑后果,这种愤怒可能是对不公正现象的恰当反应。根据指导我们行为和思想的相关因素和规范,我们能够判断一件事情正当与否,这就是恰当性的含义,也就是描述我们的态度是否符合对过去的合理判断。


For Srinivasan, social structures and routines preserve a fundamental conflict between appreciating and recognising the world as it is – and making it a better place. This is what she terms ‘affective injustice’, where victims of injustice are naturally told to suppress their authentic, natural reactions in exchange for achieving better outcomes. This tradeoff is itself unjust, for it requires the individual to suspend true sentiments to navigate the quagmire of injustice that’s reality. Individuals are forced to choose between feeling what they’re most naturally and justifiably inclined to feel, and suppressing these emotions to make practical progress. By extension, victims are often negatively judged and policed by others for feeling angry about their circumstances.

对斯里尼瓦桑来说,社会结构和惯例保留了欣赏与承认世界的现状与使世界变得更美好之间的根本冲突。这就是她所说的 “情感上的不公正”,不公正的受害者自然而然地被告知要压制自己真实的、自然的反应,以换取更好的结果。这种妥协本身就是不公正的,因为它要求个人压抑真实的情感,以在现实的不公正的泥潭中航行。个人被迫在他们倾向于感受到的最自然、最合理的情感与压抑这些情绪以取得实际进展之间做出选择。推而广之,受害者往往会因为对自己的处境感到愤怒而受到他人的负面评价和警戒。



Our ability to react aptly to injustice is a core constituent of being fully fledged moral agents.

我们对不公正现象作出适当反应的能力,是作为一个完全成熟的道德行为者的核心要素。


The choice between retributive justice and preserving other women’s interests is a clear case of affective injustice, for it coerces victims into suppressing their anger, to which they are entitled. When these individuals’ actions are justified, then simply experiencing and not acting on anger – which is, if anything, a milder and less intense reaction – could also be justified. If pursuing justice – with both anger and manifested action – can be warranted, it seems only reasonable for individuals to feel, while not acting upon, their anger.

在报应性的正义和维护其他妇女的利益之间进行选择是一个明显的情感不公正的案例,因为它迫使受害者压抑自己的愤怒,而这种愤怒是她们有权表达的。当这些人的行为是合理的,那么,仅仅是感到愤怒而不采取行动——会是一种比较温和以及并不强烈的反应——也是合理的。如果追求正义——既要有愤怒,又要有明显的行动——是要被批准的,那么,似乎唯一合理的做法是,个人在感受愤怒的同时不采取行动。


What Srinivasan perhaps misses, however, is how we should weigh up these two considerations – feeling what is apt, and feeling what is conducive towards future betterment of the current state. Indeed, there are good reasons to think that attaining better outcomes is not as important as responding aptly to injustice.

然而,斯里尼瓦桑可能忽略了这一点,我们应该如何权衡这两种考虑—-感受到什么恰当,以及什么有利于在未来改善现状。事实上,我们有充分的理由认为,获得更好的结果并不像对不公正的行为作出恰当的回应那样重要。


The reason why actions can be morally judged is because humans are moral persons capable of moral agency. Our moral agency gives meaning and value to our actions. It goes to the core of our interactions with one another. Humans, unlike machines, are broadly autonomous, responsive to a wide range of reasons, and constitute voluntary beings with our pursuit of what matters to and for us. ‘We’ are not interchangeable because each of us possesses distinctive thoughts, intentions and characters, as separate moral persons. We are guided by a range of motivations – sometimes to bring about better consequences in the future, at other times to reflect upon and appraise our past, or to make sense of what is happening to us in the now. Picking and choosing from these motivations allows us to be fundamentally free – in determining the character of the lives we lead and our moral personhood. Of course, one can choose to be fundamentally egotistical or evil – while these choices are regrettable and condemnable, our choosing them nevertheless reflects the fullest extent of our agency; we are not, and should not without further reasons, be bound by narrow interpretations of how we should live our lives.

行为之所以能够得到道德上的评判,是因为人具有道德行为能力。我们的道德能力赋予我们的行为以意义和价值。它深入到我们相互交流的核心。人类与机器不同,人类具有广泛的自主性,对各种原因作出反应,会主动追求对我们有意义的事物。’我们’是不可互换的,因为我们每个人作为独立的道德人,都拥有独特的思想、意图和性格。我们被一系列的动机所引导—有时是为了在未来收获更好的结果,有时是为了反思和评价我们的过去,或者是为了理解现在正发生在我们身上的事情。从这些动机中不断挑选,能够使我们在决定生活品质和道德人格方面从根本上获得自由。当然,一个人可以选择使自己本质上自私或者说邪恶–虽然这些选择令人遗憾,也应该受到谴责,但我们的选择却反映了我们充分发挥了自身能力;我们不会,也不该在没有进一步的理由的情况下,被关于我们生活方式的狭隘解读所束缚。


One way to exercise our moral agency is to behave in a manner that we believe brings about the best consequences. There are other methods, such as adherence to absolutist rules, as deontologists hold, or possessing the right dispositions or attitudes, as virtue theorists argue. Of course, there are times when such decisional methods overlap – a virtuous agent can be one that doesn’t break any absolute rules, or contextually brings about the best outcomes. Yet each of these moral frameworks is, at the core of their associated reasons and explanations, different. 

行使我们的道德力量的一种方法是以我们认为能带来最佳后果的方式行事。还有其他的方法,如像道义论学家所认为的那样,遵守绝对主义的规则,或如美德理论家所认为的那样,拥有正确的性情或态度。当然,这些决策方法也会有重叠的时候-——一个有道德的人可以是一个不违反任何绝对规则的人,或者是一个在情境中带来最佳结果的人。然而,这些道德框架中的每一种,在相关的原因和解释的核心方面都不相同。


On the other hand, a necessary aspect of our moral personhood, cutting across individuals who adopt completely different moral frameworks, is our capacity for judgment of and appropriate response to what befalls us – including, of course, injustices. However, we should be allowed to lead lives as dynamic agents who respond to a wide range of reasons, just as we can lead lives centred around pursuing personally significant pleasures and relationships, even at the expense of bringing about the best consequences overall.

另一方面,我们的道德人格的一个必要方面是我们对我们所遭遇的包括不公正在内的事情作出判断和适当反应的能力,这一点适用于采用完全不同的道德框架的个人。然而,我们应该被允许对各种原因作出反应并作为动态行为个体来生活,就像我们可以围绕着追求个人重要的快乐和有意义的关系来生活一样,即使代价是牺牲整体能够达到的最优结果。


Now let us take a step back, and reflect upon whether anger truly is as detrimental as Nussbaum puts it, particularly in instances of injustice. In her criticism of anger, Nussbaum argues that victims of injustice driven by anger must confront a ‘fork in the road’ – either they focus on the perpetrator of injustice, treating the act as a personal violation, and thus demand payback from the wrongdoer; or they focus on the act of injustice itself, and seek compensation, because they believe that the offender’s suffering would in fact make them better in the act’s aftermath. She views the former path as unduly self-centred and obsessive over status, at the expense of other more valuable goods that we can value intrinsically. The latter path doesn’t make sense, because retaliation does little to help recover those deprived goods. Nussbaum thus concludes that anger, at least in the Aristotelian sense, is fundamentally undesirable.

现在让我们后退一步,反思一下,愤怒是否真的像努斯鲍姆所说的那样有害,特别是在不公正的情况下,愤怒是否真的有害。在她对愤怒的批评中,努斯鲍姆认为,受愤怒驱使的不公正行为的受害者不得不面对一个 “分岔路口”—-要么他们将注意力集中在不公正行为的肇事者身上,将这一行为视为个人侵犯,从而要求不法行为人给予补偿;要么他们将注意力集中在不公正行为本身,并寻求补偿,因为他们认为,肇事者的痛苦实际上会使他在事后的行为上得到改善。她认为前者是不正当地以自我为中心,迷恋于地位,而牺牲了其他我们内在更看重的更有价值的东西。而后一种路径则没有意义,因为报复对恢复肇事者的内在品质并无帮助。努斯鲍姆由此得出结论:至少在亚里士多德式的思考中,愤怒从根本上说是不可取的。


Let’s look at the first path. Nussbaum sees anger as probabilistically connected with the feeling that we have been unduly lowered in our status – not necessarily in the wider, social sense of status, but certainly in the interpersonal sense. As such, she rejects anger because it involves a narrow obsession over status, thus crowding out our ability to pursue alternative goods other than status. 

让我们来看看第一条路。努斯鲍姆认为,愤怒可能与我们的地位被不当地降低的感觉有关–不一定是在更广泛的、社会意义上的地位,但一定是在人际意义上的。因此,她反对愤怒,因为它涉及到对地位的狭隘迷恋,从而排挤了我们追求地位以外的其他事物的能力。


Yet this view – while intuitively compelling – seems to gloss over the real lived experiences of many who undergo oppression or injustice. after all, anger directed at their former oppressors enables victims to regain their ranking in the social hierarchy. Nussbaum attempts to distinguish between ‘the injustice itself’, and ‘the way it has affected my [victim’s] ranking in the social hierarchy’, positing that we should focus on addressing the former and not the latter. Yet this distinction neglects the empirical realities that some of the worst injustices in history are precisely the subjugation of individuals’ rankings and places within the hierarchy.

然而,这种观点虽然在直觉上很有说服力,但似乎掩盖了许多遭受压迫或不公正的人的真实经历。毕竟,对曾经的压迫者的愤怒可以让受害者重新获得他们在社会等级中的地位。努斯鲍姆试图区分 “不公正本身 “和 “它对我[受害者]在社会等级制度中的地位的影响”,认为我们应该关注前者而不是后者。然而,这种区分忽视了一些经验现实:历史上一些最恶劣的不公正现象正是对个人在等级制度中地位的压制。


Anger enables victims to pinpoint the most important components of their restorative process

愤怒使受害者能够确定其恢复过程中最重要的部分。


More importantly, anger extends beyond merely the narrow desire to obtain greater status – it also embodies the total repudiation of the normative order transcribed in the injustice, and the overwhelming desire to make things better in the future. Defiance of imposed values, commitment to future progress – these seem to be not just valuable intrinsic goods, but also enabling attitudes that facilitate greater intrinsic goods to be obtained in the future.

更重要的是,愤怒不仅仅是为了获得更高的地位,它还体现了对不公正中的规范性秩序的彻底否定,以及期待未来情况变得更好的强烈愿望。对强加于人的价值观的反抗,对未来进步的承诺–这些似乎不仅仅是有价值的内在品质,而且是促进未来获得更好内在品质的的有利态度。


Nussbaum offers us a way out. She argues that such forward-looking ‘Transition-Anger’ should be taken as the exception to the norm, and concedes that such anger has value but must be separated from the ‘garden-variety anger’ most ubiquitous in everyday life.

努斯鲍姆为我们提供了一条出路。她认为,这种具有前瞻性的 “过渡性愤怒 “应该被视为例外,并承认这种愤怒是有价值的,但必须与日常生活中最无处不在的 “普通的愤怒 “区分开来。


Yet such a distinction doesn’t seem to be empirically tenable – it’s difficult to imagine individuals being motivated by anger to assiduously avert future injustices, without at least a tinge of anger in how they react to past and present events that have befallen them or their colleagues. Requiring victims to channel all their reactive anger into institutional reform appears to be steeped in affective injustice of another sort. This requirement is far too demanding and unsympathetic to victims’ often entangled emotions and complex situations. Nussbaum’s first attack on anger doesn’t stand.

然而,这种区分似乎在经验上是站不住脚的——很难想象,一个人在愤怒的驱使下,努力避免未来的不公正,却对过去和现在发生在自己或同事身上的事情的反应,不会感到一丝愤怒。要求受害者把他们所有被动的愤怒都投入到体制改革中去,似乎是另一种不公正的情绪化的表现。这种要求太过苛刻,对受害者时常具有的纠结情绪和复杂情况缺乏同情心。努斯鲍姆对愤怒的第一次攻击并不成立。


So what of the second path, the alleged futility of focusing on the act of injustice itself? Nussbaum argues that when we try to regain what we have lost through anger, we never succeed. Anger is overpowering and dominant as an emotion – and renders reconciliation and healing impossible. It also fixates upon the lost cause of attempting to recover the irrevocable. Only in the absence of anger, Nussbaum posits, could we move forward and work towards genuine self-betterment.

那么,第二条路,即所谓的专注于不公正行为本身的徒劳无功,又是怎么回事呢?努斯鲍姆认为,当我们试图通过愤怒来重新得到我们失去的东西时,我们永远不会成功。愤怒作为一种情绪,是压倒性的,并且占据着主导地位–在愤怒面前,和解和治愈不可能实现。它还会使我们纠结于试图挽回不可能挽回的事物。努斯鲍姆认为,只有在没有愤怒的情况下,我们才能向前迈进,努力实现真正的自我提高。


Here her argument once again falls short in instances of predicaments confronting most victims of structural injustices and systemic oppression. Where their core goods and interests are stripped away, anger is the sole emotion that offers reassurance that such injustices are through no fault of their own, and that they ought to feel proactively involved in the restoration of goods to which they are entitled. The alternatives to anger in these cases are unlikely to be sanguine hope or prudent optimism. We could hope for these alternatives, but they are likely to be despair, regret and blame – all far more defeatist and inward-looking emotions that sap the very motivation that propels victims to seek justice for their wronging.

在大多数结构性不公正和系统性压迫的受害者所面临的困境中,她的论点再次出现了问题。当人们的核心财产和利益被剥夺时,愤怒是唯一能让人放心的情绪,它使人们确信,这种不公正不是因为他们自己的过错而造成的,他们应该积极主动地采取行动,努力拿回他们应得的事物。在这些情况下,悲观的希望或审慎的乐观不可能产生与愤怒同样的作用。我们可以寄希望于这些替代方案,但它们很可能是绝望、后悔和自责—-这些都是更多的失败主义和内向的情绪,会削弱推动受害者为自己的错误行为寻求正义的动机。


While anger might not be the most practically useful emotion to have in all cases, its epistemic and motivational productivity makes it the ideal candidate in steering victims towards making appropriate claims to compensation or reparation. It is the anger towards losing what matters that enables victims to pinpoint the most important components of their restorative process – of course, we might not think that restoration is intrinsically most valuable, but this critique misses the point. Anger can play a crucial role in recovering lost goods.

虽然愤怒可能不是所有事件中事件中最有用的情感,但它的认识论和激励作用使它成为引导受害者提出适当的赔偿或赔偿或补偿要求的理想选择。正是对失去重要的东西的东西的愤怒,使受害者能够确定其恢复过程中最重要的部分–当然,我们可能不认为恢复是最有内在价值的,但这种批判偏离了重点。愤怒在找回失物的过程中可以起到至关重要的作用。


For far too long, anger has been maligned and rejected as having no role to play in mature politics. Yet, in reality, injustice and failure often leave us feeling angry. And that’s quite all right. Anger need not be defeatist or destructive – it is productive, justified and an innate component of what makes us human.

长期以来,愤怒一直被恶意诋毁和排斥,被认为在成熟的政治中没有任何作用。然而,在现实中,不公正和失败常常让我们感到愤怒。这是很正常的。愤怒不一定是失败主义或破坏性的–它可以是有成效且合理的,它是我们人类与生俱来的一部分。



愤怒之果

  • 本文原载于 Aeon

  • 原文链接:https://aeon.co/essays/anger-is-a-valuable-emotion-driving-private-and-public-good


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愤怒之果

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